Imperialism is the process of
extending one state control over another a process that takes many forms. Historians
begin by distinguishing between formal and informal imperialism. “Formal
imperialism”, or colonialism, was sometimes exercised by direct rule: the
colonizing nations annexed territories outright and established new governments
to subjugate and administer other states and peoples. Sometimes colonialism
worked through indirect rule: the conquering Europeans reached agreements with indigenous
leaders and governed them. There was no single technique of colonial management;
as we will see, resistance forced colonial powers to shift strategies
frequently. “Informal imperialism” refers to a more subtle and less visible exercise
of power, in which the stronger state allowed the weaker state to maintain, its
independence while reducing its sovereignty. Informal imperialism took the form
of carving out zones European sovereignty and privilege, such as treaty ports,
within other states. It could mean using European economic, political, and
cultural power to get advantages treaties or terms of trade. Informal
imperialism was not only common; it played an even more fundamental role in
shaping global power relations.
Both formal and informal
imperialism expanded dramatically in the nineteenth century. The “scramble for
Africa” was the most sudden and startling case of formal imperialism: from 1875
to 1902 Europeans seized up to 90 percent of the continent. The overall picture
is no less remarkable: between 1870 and 1900, a small group of western states
[France, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, and the United States]
colonized about one quarter of the world land surface. In addition to these
activities, Western states extended informal empire in sections of China and
Turkey, across South and East Asia, and into Central and South America. So
striking was this expansion of European power and sovereignty that by the late
nineteenth century contemporaries were speaking of the “new imperialism”.
Imperialism was not new. It is
more helpful to think of nineteenth-century developments as a new stage of
European empire building. The “second European empires” took hold after the
first empires, especially those in the New World, had by and large collapsed.
The British Empire in North America was shattered in 1776 by the American Revolution.
French imperial ambitions across the Atlantic were toppled along with napoleon.
Spanish and Portuguese domination of Central and South America ended with the Latin
American revolutions of the early nineteenth century. In what ways were the second,
nineteenth-century European empires different?
The nineteenth-century empires
developed against the backdrop of developments we have considered in the
preceding chapters: industrialization, liberal revolutions, and the rise of
nation –states. These developments changes Europe, and they changed European
imperialism. First, industrialization created new economic needs for raw materials.
Second, industrialization, liberalism, and science forged a new view of the
world, history, and the future. A distinguishing feature of nineteenth-century
imperialism laid in Europeans conviction that economic development and
technological advances would inevitably bring progress to the rest of the
world. Third, especially in the case of Britain and France, the
nineteenth-century imperial powers were also in principle democratic nations,
where government authority rested on consent and on the equality of most citizens.
This made conquest and subjugation more difficult to justify and raised
increasingly thorny questions about the status of colonized peoples.
Nineteenth-century imperialists sought to distance themselves from earlier
histories of conquest. They spoke not of winning souls for the church or
subjects for the king, but rather of building railroads and harbors,
encouraging social reform, and fulfilling Europe’s secular mission to bring
civilization to the world. The “new” aspects of nineteenth-century imperialism,
however, resulted equally from changes and events outside Europe. Resistance,
rebellion, and recognition of colonial failures obliged Europeans to developed
new strategies of rule. The Haitian revolution of 1804 , echoed by slave rebellions
in the early nineteenth century, compelled the British and French, slowly to
end the slave trade and slavery in their colonies in the 1830 and 1840,
although new systems of forced labor cropped up to take their places. The
examples of the American Revolution encouraged the British to grant
self-government to white settler in Canada [1867], Australia [1901], and New
Zealand [1912]. In India , as we will see, the British responded to rebellion
by taking the area away from the east India Company and putting it under control
of the crown, by requiring civil servants to undergo more training, and by much
more careful policing of indigenous peoples. Almost everywhere,
nineteenth-century empires established carefully codified racial hierarchies to
organize relationships between Europeans and different groups. [Apartheid in
South Africa is but one example]. In general, nineteenth-century imperialism
involved less independent ‘entrepreneurial’ activity by merchants and traders
[such as the East India Company] and more “settlement and discipline.” This
meant that empire became a vast project, involving legions of administrators,
school teachers, and engineers. Nineteenth-century imperialism then arose from
new motives. It produced new forms of government and management in the colonies.
Last, it created new kinds of interactions between Europeans and indigenous
peoples.
THE
NEW IMPERIALISM AND ITS CAUSES
All historical events have many
causes. The causes of a development with the scope, intensity, and long range
importance of the “new imperialism’ inevitably provoke heated controversy. The
most influential and long standing interpretation points to the economic
dynamics of imperialism. As early as 1902, the British writer J. a Hobson
charged that what he named the “scramble for Africa” had been driven by the
interest of a small group of wealthy financiers. British taxpayers subsidized
armies of conquest and occupation, and journalists whipped up the public’s
“spectatorial lust of jingoism” but Hobson believed that the core interests
behind imperialism where those of international capitalists. At a time when
fierce economic competition was producing protectionism and monopolies, he
argued, and when Western Europe did not provide the markets that industry
needed, investors sought out secure investment opportunities overseas, in colonies.
Hobson saw investors and international bankers as the central players: “large
savings are made which cannot find any profitable investment in this country,
they must find employment elsewhere.” Yet investors were not alone. Their
interest matched those of manufactures involved in colonial trade, the military,
and the armaments industry. Hobson was a reformer and social critic. His point
was that international finance and business had distorted conceptions of England’s
real national interest. He hoped that genuine democracy would be an antidote to
the country imperial tendencies.
Hobson’s analysis, still widely
read, inspired the most influential Marxist clique of imperialism, which came
from the Russian socialist and revolutionary leader Vladimir Iliac Lenin. Like
Hobson, Lenin underscored the economics of imperialism. Unlike Hobson, he
considered imperialism to be an integral part of late – nineteenth-century
capitalism. Competition and the monopolies that it produced had lowered
domestic profits. Capitalists, Lenin argued, could only enlarge their markets
at home by raising workers wages, which would have the effect of further reducing
profits. Thus the “internal contradictions” of capitalism produced imperialism,
compelling capitalists to invest and to search for new markets overseas. If
this were the case, it followed that Hobson hopes for democratic reform were misplaced;
only overthrowing capitalism itself could check imperialist expansion,
conflict, and violence. Lenin published his book [imperialism: the highest
stage of capitalism, 1917] at the height of World War 1, a war many considered
imperialist. The timing gave reel urgency to his argument that revolution alone
could topple capitalism, imperialism, and the forces that had brought the world
to the brink of disaster.
Historians now would agree that
economic pressures were one though only one, important cause of imperialism. In
the case of Great Britain, roughly half its total o 4 billion in foreign invesment
was at work within its empire. As Hobson, Lenin, and their contemporaries
correctly noted, late nineteenth-century London was rapidly becoming the banker
of the world. In all western euro pen countries, demand for raw materials made
colonies seem a necessary investment and helped persuade government that
imperialism was a worthwhile policy. Rubber, tin, and foods, coffee, sugar,
tea, wool, and grain supplied European consumers. Yet the economics explanation
has limits. Colonial markets were generally too poor to meet the needs of
European manufactures. Africa, the continent over which Europeans frantically
“scrambled” was the poorest and least profitable to investors. Regarding
overseas investment, before 1914 only a very small portion of German capital
was invested in Russia, hoping to stabilize that ally against the Germans, than
in all their colonel possessions. Yet some of these calculations are clear only
in retrospect. Many nineteenth-century Europeans expected the colonies to
produce profits. French newspapers, for instance, reported that the Congo was
“rich vigorous. And fertile virgin territory, ” with “fabulous quantities” of
gold, copper, ivory, and rubber. Such hopes certainly contributed to
expansionism, even if the profits of empire did not match Europeans
expectations.
A second interpretation of
imperialism emphasizes strategic and nationalist motives more than economic
interest. International rivalries reinforced the belief that vital national
interest were at stake, and made European powers more determined to control
both the government and economies of less developed nations and territories.
French politicians supported imperialism as a means of restoring national
prestige and honor, lost in the humiliating defeat by the Prussians in
1870-1871. The British on the other hand, looked with alarm at the accelerating
pace of industrialization in Germany and France and feared losing their
existing and potential world markets. The Germans recently unified in a modern
nation, viewed overseas empire as a “national” birthright possession and as a
way of entering the club of great powers.
This second, noneconomic,
interpretation stresses the links between imperialism and nineteenth-century state and nation
building. That nations should be empires was not always self-evident. Otto Von
Bismarck, the architect of German unification, long considered colonialism
overseas a distraction from far more serious issues on the continent of Europe.
By the last decades of the century, however , Germany had joined France and
England in what seemed an urgent race for territories. Advocates of colonialism
from businessmen and explores to writer [such as Rudyard Kipling] and political
theorists- spelled out why empire was important to a new nation. Colonies did
more than demonstrate military power, they showed the vigor of a nation
economy, the strength of its convictions, the will of its citizenry, the force
of its laws and the power of its culture. A strong national community could
assimilate others, bring progress to new lands and new peoples.
One German proponent of expansion
called colonialism the “national continuation of the German desire for unity”.
Lobby groups such as the German colonial society, the French colonial party,
and the royal colonial institute argued for empire in similar terms, as id
newspaper, which also recognized the attraction of sensational stories of
overseas conquest. Presented in this way, as part of nation building,
imperialism seemed to rise above particular interest or mundane cost-benefit
analysis. Culture law, religion, and industry were vital national products, and
their value rose as they were exported and defended abroad.
Third, imperialism had important
cultural dimensions. A French diplomat once described the British imperial
adventure Cecil Rhodes as “a force cast in an idea” the same might be said of
imperialism itself. Imperialism as an idea excited such explores as the
Scottish missionary David Livingston, who believed that the British conquest of
Africa slave trade, and “introduce the negro family into the body of corporate
nations”. Rudyard Kipling, the British poet and novelist, wrote of the “white
man’s burden”, a notorious phrase that referred to the European mission to
“civilize” what Kipling and others considered the “barbaric” and “heathen”
quarters of the globe. Taking arms against the slave trade, famine, disorder,
and illiteracy seemed to many Europeans not only a reason to invade Africa and
Asia, but also a duty and proof of a somehow superior civilization. These
convictions did not cause imperialism, but they illustrate how central empire
building became to the west self image. In short, it is difficult to
disentangle the economic, political, and strategic “causes” of imperialism. It
is more important to understand how the motives over lapped. Strategic interest
often persuaded policy makers that economics issues were at stake. Different
constituencies- the military, international financiers, missionaries, colonial
lobby groups at home- held different and often clashing visions of the purpose
and benefits of imperialism. “imperial policy” was less a matter of long-range
planning than of a series of quick responses, often improvised, to particular
situations. International rivalries led policy makers to redefine their
ambitions. So did individual explorers, entrepreneurs, or group of settlers who
established claims to hitherto unknown territories that home government then
felt compelled to recognize and defend. Finally, Europeans were not te only
players on the stage. Their goals and practices were shaped by social changes
in the countries in which they became involved , by the independent interest of
local peoples , and by resistance , which as often as not, they found
themselves unable to understand and powerless to stop.
Is there any reason to call nineteenth-century
imperialism “new”? economic integration or developing lines of investment and
trade to the advantages of the European, was not new. The informal and
subterranean exercise of European power at work in Latin America, china and the
ottoman empire was a much more long term process. This kind of power expanded
more or less continuously through the modern period. But nineteenth-century
imperialism did have new aspects or specific features stamped on it by
developments within Europe and by indigenous to Europeans.
IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH ASIA
How was the Indian empire
reorganized after the munity on 1857?
India was the center of the British
empire, the jewel of the British crown. It was also an inheritance from
eighteenth-century empire building, secured well before the period of the “new
imperialism”. The conquest of most of the subcontinent began in the 1750 and
quickened during the age of revolution. Conquering India helped compensate for
losing north America. General Cornwallis defeated at York town, went on to a
brilliant career in India. By the mid nineteenth century, India had become the
focal point of Britain newly expanded global power, which reached from southern
Africa across south Asia and to Australia. Keeping this region involved
changing tactics and forms of rule.
Until the mid-nineteenth century,
British territories in the subcontinent were under the control of the British east
India company. The company had its own military, divided into European and [far
larger] Indian divisions. The company held the right to collect taxes on land
from Indian peasants. Until the early nineteenth century, the company had legal
monopolies over trade in all goods, including indigo, textiles, salt, minerals,
and most lucrative of all, opium. The British government had granted trade
monopolies in its northern American colonies. Unlike North American, however, India
never became a settler state. In the 183s Europeans were a tiny minority,
numbering forty-five thousands in an Indian population of 150 million. The
company government was military and repressive. Soldiers collected taxes, civil
servants wore military uniform: British troops brashly commandeered peasant’s
oxen and carts for their own purpose. Typically, though, the company could not
enforce its rule uniformly. It governed some areas directly, other through
making alliances with local leaders, and others still by simply controlling
goods and money. Indirect rule, here as in other empires, meant finding
indigenous collaborators and maintaining their good will. Thus the British
cultivated groups that had provided administrators in earlier regimes the Rajputs
and Bhumihars of north India, whom they considered especially effective
soldiers ,and merchants of big cities such as Calcutta. They offered economic
privileges, state offices, or military posts to either groups or entire nations
that agreed to ally with the British against others
British policy shifted between
two poles: one group wanted to westernize” India, another believed it safer,
and more practical, to defer to local culture. Christian missionaries, whose
numbers rose as occupation expanded, were determined to replace “blind superstition”
with the “genial influence of Christian light and truth”. Indignant at such
practices as child marriage and sati [in which a widow immolated herself on her
husband funeral pyre], they sought support in England for a wide-ranging
assault on Hindu culture. Secular reformers, many of them liberal, considered ‘Hindoos’
and ‘Mahommedans’ susceptible to forms of despotism- in both the family and in
the state. They turned their reforming
zeal to legal and political change. But other company and British
administrators warned their country men not to meddle with Indian institutions
and practices. ‘Englishmen are as great fanatics in politics as Mahommedans in
religion. They suppose that no country can be saved without English
institutions’ said one British administrator. Indirect rule, they argued, would
only work with the cooperation of local powers. Conflicts such as these meant
that the British never agreed on any single cultural policy.
FROM
MUTINY TO REBELLION
The company rule often met resistance
and protest. In 1857-1858, it was particularly badly shaken by what the British
called the sepoy [soldiers]rebellion’ now known in India as the great rebellion
of 1857. The uprising began near Delhi, when the military disciplined a
regiment of sepoys [ the traditional tern for Indian soldiers employed by the
British] for refusing to use rifle cartridges greased with pork fat
unacceptable to either Hindus or Muslims. Yet as the British Prime minister
Disraeli later observed, the decline and fall of empires are not affairs of
greased cartridges’. The causes of the mutiny were much deeper and involved
social, economic and political grievances. Indian peasants attacked law courts
and burned tax rolls, protesting debt and corruption. In areas such as Oudh,
which had recently been annexed, rebels defended their traditional leaders, who
had been summarily ousted by the British. Army officers from privileged castes
resented arbitrary treatment at the hands of the British, they were first
promoted as loyal allies and then forced to serve without what they considered
titles and honors. The mutiny spread through large areas of northwest India.
European troops, which counted for fewer than one fifth of those in arms found
themselves losing control. Religious leaders, both Hindu and Muslim, seized the
occasion to denounce Christian missionaries sent in by the British and their
assault on local traditional and practices.
At
first the British were faced with a desperate situation, with areas under British
control cut off from one another and pro-British cities under siege. Loyal
Indian troops were brought south from the frontiers, and British troops, fresh
from the Crimean war, were shipped directly from Britain to suppress the
rebellion. The fighting lasted more than a year, and the British matched the
rebels early massacres and vandalism with a systematic campaign of repression.
Whole rebel units were either killed rather than being allowed to surrender or
else tried on the spot and executed. Towns and village that supported the
rebels were burned, just as the rebels had burned European homes and out spots.
Yet the defeat of the rebellion caught the British public imagination. After the
bloody, inconclusive mess of Crimea, the terrifying threat to British India and
the heroic rescue of European hostages and British territory by British troops
were electrifying news. Pictures of the Scottish highland regiments [wearing
wool kilts in the sweltering heat of India] liberating besieged white women and
children went up in homes across the United Kingdom. At a political level, British
leaders were stunned by how close the revolt had brought them to disaster and
were determined never to repeat the same mistakes.
After
“the munity”, the British were compelled to reorganize their Indian empire, developing
new strategies of rule. The east India company was abolished, replaced by the
British crown. The British raj [or rule] was governed directly, though the British
also sought out collaborators and cooperative interest groups. Princely India
was left to the indigenous princes, who were subject to British advisors. The British
also reorganized the military, and tried to change relations among soldier.
Indigenous troops were separated from each other, in order to avoid the kind of
“fraternization” that proved subversive. As one British officer put it, “if one
regiment mutinies I should like to have the next so alien that it would fire
into it”. Even more than before, the British sought to rule through the Indian
upper classes rather than in opposition to them. Queen Victoria, now empress of
India, set out the principles of indirect rule. “We shall respects the rights,
dignity and honour of native princes as our own, and we desire that they , as
well as our own subject should enjoy that prosperity and that social
advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government.”
Civil –service reform opened up new positions to members of the Indian upper
classes. The briish had to reconsider their relationship to Indian cultures.
Missionary activity was subdued, and the british channeled their reforming
impulses into the more secular projects of economic development, railways,
roads, irrigation and so on. Still consensus of effective colonial strategies
was elusive . Some administrators counseled more reform and change, other
sought to give the princes more support , the british tried both, in fits and
starts until the end british rule 1947
In
india , the most prominent representative of the “new imperialism” was lord
Curzon, a prominent conservative and the
viceroy of india from 1898 to 1905. Curzon deepened british commitments to the
region. Concerned about the british position in the world, he warned of the
need to fortify india borders against Russia. He urged continued economic
investment. Curzon worried out loud that the british would be worn down by
resistance to the raj, and that confronted with their apparent inability to
transform Indian culture, they would become cynical get “lethargic and think
only of home”. In the same way that ruyard kipling urged the british and the
American to “take up the white mans burden”, Curzon pleaded with his countrymen
to see how central india was to the greatness
of Britain.
What
did india provide to great Britain? By the eve of world war1,india was britain
largest export market. One tenth of all the british empire trade passed through
india port cities of madras, Bombay, and Calcutta. India mattered enormously to
brittain balance of payments: surpluses earned there compensated for deficits
with Europe and the united states. Equally important to grat Britain were the
human resources of india.Indian laborers worked on tea plantations in Asam,
near Bura, and they built railways and dams in southern Africa and Egypt.
British rule casts an enormous diaspora of Indian workers throughout the
empire. Over a million indentured Indian servants left their country in the
second half of the century. India also provided the british empire with highly
trained engineers, land surveyors, clerks, bureaucrats, schoolteachers, and
merchants. The nationalists leader Mohandas Gandhi , for instance, first came
into the public eye as a young lawyer in Pretoria, south Africa, where he
worked for an Indian law firm. The british deployed Indian troops across the
empire [ they would later call up roughly 1.2 million troops in world war 1].
For all these reason men such as Curzon found it impossible to imagine their
empire or even their nation without india.
How
did the british raj shape Indian society?. The british practice of indirect
rule sought to create an Indian elite that would serve british interest a group
‘who may be the interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern a class
of persons Indian in colour and blood , but English in taste, in opinion, in
morals, and in intellect”, as one british writer put in. Eventually, this
practice created a large social group of british educated Indian civil servants
and businessmen, well trained for government and skeptical about british claims
that they brought progress to the subcontinent. This group provided the
leadership for the nationalist movement that challenged british rule in india.
At the same time, this group became increasingly distant from the rest of the
nation. The overwhelming majority of Indians remained desperately poor
peasents, many of them unable to pay taxes and thus in debt to british
landlords, all strunggling to subsist on diminishing plots of land, villagers
working in the textile trad beaten down by imports of cheap anufactured goods
from England, all residents of what would become the most populous nation in
the world
IMPERIALISM IN CHINA
How did western countries “open”
china?
In china , too European
imperialism escalated early, well before the period of the “new imperialism’.Yet
there it took a different form. Europeans did not conquer and annex whole
regions . Instead , they forced favorable trade agreements as gunpoint, set up
treaty ports where Europeans lived and worked under their own jurisdiction, and
established outpost of European
missionary activity all with such dispatch that the Chinese spoke of their
country as being carved up like a melon.
Since
the seventeenth century European trade with china in coveted luxuries such as
silk, porcelain, art object, and the Chinese government, which was determined
to keep foreign traders, and foreign influence in general, at bay. By the early
nineteenth century, however, britain global ambitions and rising power were
setting the stage for a confrontation. Freed from the task of fighting
napoleon, the british set their sights on improving the terms of the china
trade , demanding the rights to come into open harbors and to have special
trading privileges. The other source of constant friction involved the harsh
treatment of british subjects by Chinese law courts including the summary
execution of several Britons convicted of crimes. And by the 1830 these
diplomatic conflicts had been heightened by the opium trade.
THE OPIUM TRADE
Opium
provided a direct link among Britain, British India, and China. Since the
sixteenth century, the drug had been produced in India and carried by Dutch,
and later, British traders. In Fact, opium [derived from the poppy plant] was one
the very few commodities that European could sell in China, and for this reason
it become crucial to the balance of east west trade. When the british conquered
northeast India, they also annexed one of the richest opium growing areas and
became deeply involved in the trade so much so that historians do not shy from
calling east india company rule a “ narco- military empire ”. British agencies
designated specific poppy-growing regions and gave cash advances to Indian
peasants who would cultivate the crop. Producing opium was a labor-intensive
process: peasant cultivators the sap and formed it into opium balls, which were
dried before being weighed and shipped out, In the opium- producing areas
northwest of Calcutta,”factories” employed as many as one thousand Indian
workers forming and curing the opim, as well as young boys whose job it was to
turn the opium balls every four days.
From
India, the east india company sold the opium to “country traders” small fleets
of british, dutch, and Chinese shippers who carried the drug to southeast asia
and china. Silver paid for the opium came back to the east india company, which
used it, in turn to buy Chinese goods for the Europeans market. The trade,
therefore, was not only profitable, it was key to a triangular europens Indian
Chinese economic relationship. Production and export rose dramatically in the
early nineteenth century. By the 1830s: when the british Chinese confrontation
was taking shape, opium provided british india with more revenues than any
other source except taxes on land.
People
all over the world consumed opium, for medical reasons as well as for pleasure.
The Chinese market was especially lucrative. Eighteenth century china had
witnessed a craze for tobacco smoking that taught users how to smoke opium. A
large, wealthy Chinese elite of merchant and government officials provided much
of the market, but opium smoking also became popular among soldiers, students,
and Chinese laborers. In the nineteenth century opium imports followed Chinese
labor al over the world to southeast asia and san Francisco. In an effort to
control the problem, the Chinese government banned opium imports, prohibited
domestic production, criminalized smoking, and in the 1830s began a full scale
campaign to purge the drug from china. That campaign set the Chinese emperor on
a collision course with british opium traders. In one confrontation the Chinese
drug commissioner Lin confiscated 3 million pounds of raw opium from the
british abd washed it out to sea. In another the Chinese authorities blockaded
british ships in port, and local citizens demonstrated angrily in front of
british residences.
THE OPIUM WARS
In
1839, these simmering conflicts broke into what was called the firt “opium
war”. Drugs were not the core of the matter. The highlighted larger issues of
sovereignty and economic status: the Europeans “rights” to trade with whom ever
they pleased , by passing Chinese monopolies; to set up zones of Europeans
residence in defiance of Chinese sovereignty; and to proselytize and open
schools. War flared up several times over the course of the century. After the
first war of 1839-1842, in which british steam vessels and guns overpowered in
Chinese fleet, the treaty of Nanking 1842 compelled the Chinese to give the
british trading privilegers, the right to reside in five cities, and the port
of hong kong “in perpetuity” . After a second war the british secured yet more
treaty ports and privileges, including the rights to send in missionaries. In
the aftermath of those agreements between the Chinese and british, other
countries demanded similar rights and economic opportunities. By the end of the
nineteenth century, during the period of the new imperialism, the French, germans,
and russians had claimed mining rights and permission to build railroads, to
begin manufacturing with cheap Chinese labor, and to arm and police Europeans
communities in Chinese cities. In shanghai, for instance, seventeen thousand
foreigners lived with their own courts, school, churches, and utilities. The
united states, not wanting to be shouldered aside, demanded its own “open door
policy”. Japan wa an equally active imperialist power in the pacific, and the
sinojapanese war on 1894-1895 was a decisive moment in the history of the
region. The Japanese victory forced china to concede trading privileges, the
independence of Korea, and the Liaotung Peninsula in Manchuria. It opened a
scramble for spheres of influence and for mining and railway concessions. The
demand for reparations forced the chinnese government to levy greater taxes.
All these measures heightened resentment and destabilized the regime.
Surrendering
previleges to Europeans and the Japanese seriously undermined the authority of
the Chinese qing emperor at home and only heightened popular hostility to
foreign intruders. Authority at the imperial center had been eroding for more
than a century by 1900, hastened by the opium wars and by the vast taiping
rebellion 1852-1864, an enormous, bitter, and deadly conflicts in which radical
Christian rebels in south central china challenged the authority of the
emperors themselves. On the defensive against the rebels, the dynasty hired
foreign generals, including the british commander Charles Gordon to lead its forces. The war devastated china
agricultural heartland, and the death toll, never confirmed, may have reached
20 million. This ruinous disorder, and the increasing inability of the emperor
to keep order and collect the taxes necessary to stabilize trade and repay
foreign loans, led Europeans countries to take more and more direct control of
their side of the “ china trade”
THE BOXER REBELLION
From a western perspective, the
most important of the nineteenth century rebellions against the corruptions of
foreign rule was the boxer rebellion of 1900. The boxers were a secret society
of young men trained in chine martial arts and believed to have spiritual
powers. Anti foreign and anti missionary, they provided the spark for a loosely
organized but widespread uprising in northern china. Bands of boxes attacked
foreign engineers, tore up railways lines, and in the spring of 1900 marched on
Beijing . They laid siege to the foreign legations in the city , home to
several thousand western diplomats and merchants and their families . The
legations small garrison defended their walled compound with little more than
rifles, bayonets, and improvised artillery, but they withstood the siege for
fifty-five days until a large relief column arrived. The rebellion,
particularly the siege at Beijing, mobilized a global response. Europe Great
powers, rivals everywhere else in the world, drew together in response to this
crisis in order to tear china part. An expedition numbering twenty thousand
troops combining the forces of Britain, France, the United States, Germany,
Italy, Japan, and Russia ferociously repressed the boxer movement. The outside
powers then demanded indemnities, new trading concessions, and reassurances
from the Chinese government.
The
boxer rebellion was one of several anti imperialist movements at the end of the
nineteenth century. The rebellion testified to the vulnerability of Europeans
imperial power. It dramatized the resources Europeans would have to devote to
maintaining their far-flung influence. In the process of repression, the
europes became committed to propping up corrupt and fragile governments in
order to protect their agreements and interest, and they were drawn into
putting down popular uprisings against local inequalities and foreign rule.
In
china the age of the new imperialism capped a century of conflict and
expansion. By 1900, virtually all of Asia had been divided up among the
European powers. Japan, an active imperial power in its own rights, alone had
maintained its independence. British rule extended from india across Burma,
Malaya, Australia and new Zealand . The dutch, Britain longstanding trade
rivals , secured indonesia. During the 1880s[ among Britain, france, and
Russia, china and japan] caused the strunggle for influence and economic advantages in asia, that
strunggle, in turn exacerbated nationalist feeling Imperial expansion, the expression of
Europeans power, was showing its destabilizing effects.
RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM
Russia was a persistently
imperialist power throughout the nineteenth century. Its rulers championed a
policy of annexation by conquest, treaty or both of lands bordering on the
existing Russian state. Beginning in 1801, with the acquisition of Georgia
following a war with Persia, the tsars continued to pursue their expansionist
dream. Bessarabia and Turkestan[taken from the turks] and Armenia[from the
Persians] vastly increased the empire size. This southward colonization brought
the Russian close to war with the british twice; first in 1881 when Russian
troops occupied territories in the trans Caspian region, and again in
1884-1887, when the tsars forces advanced to the frontier of Afghanistan. In
both cases the british feared incursions into areas they deemed within their
sphere of influence in the middle east. They were concerned, as well about a
possible threat to india. The maneuvering, spying, and support of friendly
puppet governments by Russia and britain became known as the ‘great game’ and
foreshadowed western countries jockeying for the regions oil resources in the
twentieth century.
Russian
expansion also moved east. In 1875, the Japanese traded the southern half of
Sakhalin island for the previously RusSion Kurile islands. The tsars eastward
advance was finally halted in 1904. Russian expansion in Mongolia and Manchuria
came up against Japanese expansion, and the two powers went to war. Russia huge
imperil army more than met its match in a savage, bloody conflict. Russian navy
was sent halfway round the world to reinforce the beleaguered Russian troops,
but was ambushed and sunk by the better trained and equipped Japanese fleet.
This national humiliation helped provoke a revolt in Russia and led to an
american brokered peace treaty in 1905. The defeat shook the already unsteady
regime of the tsar, and proved that European nations were no the only ones who
could play the imperial game successfully.
THE FRENCH EMPIRE AND CIVILIZING
MISSION
Like british expansion into
india, French colonialism in northern Africa began before the so called new
imperialism of the late nineteenth century. By the 1830s, the French had
created a general government of their possessions in Algeria, the most
important of which were cities along the Mediterranean coast. From the outset
the Algerian, the conquest was different from most other colonial ventures:
Algeria became a settler state, one of the few a part from south Africa. Some
of the early settlers were utopian socialists, out to create ideal communities;
some were workers the French government deported after the revolution of 1848
to be “resettled” safely as farmers; some were winegrowers whose vines at home
had been destroyed by an insect infestation. The settlers were by no means all
French; they included Italian, Spanish, and maltese merchants and shopkeepers
of modes means, laborers, and peasants. By the 1870s, in several of the coastal
cities, the new creole community outnumbered indigenous Algerians, and within
it, other Europeans outnumber the French. With the French military help, the
settlers appropriated land, and French business concerns took cork forests and
established mining in cooper,lead and iron. Economic activity was for European
benefit. The first railrods, for instance, did not even carry passengers; they
took iron ore to the coasts for export to france, where it would be smelted and
sold.
The
settlers and the French governments did not necessarily pursue common goals. In
the 170s, the new and still fragile third republic [founded after napolean111
was defeated in 1870] in an effort to ensure the settlers loyalty, made the
colony a department of france. This gave the French settlers the full rights of
republican citizenship. It also gave them the power to pass laws in Algeria
that consolidated their privileges and community [ naturalizing al Europeans,
for instance] and further disenfranchised indigenous populations, who had no
voting rights at all. French politicians in paris occasionally objected to
settlers contemptuous treatment of indigenous peoples, arguing that it
subverted the project of “lifting up” the natives. The French settlers in
Algeria had little interest in such a project; although they paid lip service
to republican ideals, they wanted the advantages of “frenchness” for
themselves. Colonial administrators and social scientists differentiated the
“good” mountain dwelling berbers, who could be brought into French society,
from the “bad” arabs whose religion made them supposedly inassimilable. In
Algeria, then, colonialism was at the very least a three way relationship and
illustrates the dynamics that made colonialism in general a contradictory
enterprise.
Before
the 1870s colonial activities aroused relatively little interest among the
French at home. But after the humiliating defeat in the franco- Prussian
war[180-181] and the establishment of the third republic, colonial lobby groups
and, gradually, the government, became increasingly adamant about the benefits
of colonialism. These benefits were not simply economic. Taking on the
“civilizing mission” woud reinforce the purpose of the French republic and the
prestige of the French people. It was frances duty “ to contribute to this work
of civilization.” Jules ferry, republican political leader, successfully argued
for expanding the frenh presence in indochina, saying, “ we must believe that if
providence deigned to confer upon us a mission by making us masters of the
earth, this mission consists not of attempting an impossible fusion of the
races but of simply spreading or awakening among the other races the superior
notions of which we are the guardians”. Those “ superior notions” included a
commitment to economic and technological progress and to liberation from
slavery, political oppression, poverty, and disease. In what ferry ironically
considered an attack on the racism of his contemporaries, he argued that” the
superior races have a right vis-Ã -vis the inferior races… they have a right to
civilize them”.
Under
ferry, the france acquired Tunisia [1881], northern and central vietnam9 tonkin
and annam: 1883], and laos and Cambodia[1893]. They also carried this
“civilizing mission” into their colonies in west Africa. European and atlantic
trade with the west coast of Africa, in slaves, gold, and ivory, had ben well
established for centuries. In the late nineteenth century, trade gave way to formal
administration. The year 1895 saw the established of a federation of French
west Africa, a loosely organized administration to govern an area nine time the
size of france, including guinea, Senegal and the ivory coast. Even with forms
and centralization in 1902. French control remained uneven. Despite military
campaign of pacification, resistance remained, and the French deal gingerly
with tribal leaders t some times deferring to their authority and at others
trying to break their power. They established French courts and law only in
cities, leaving Islamic or tribal courts to run other areas. The federation
aimed to rationalize the economic exploitation of the area, and to replace
“booty capitalism” with a more careful management and development of resources.
The French called this “enhancing the value” of the region, which was part of
the civilizing mission of the modern republic. The federation embarked on an
ambitious program of public works. Engineers rebuilt the huge harbor at Dakar
the most important on the coasts to accommodate rising exports. with some
utopian zeal they redesigned older cities, tried to improve sanitation and
health, improved water systems, and so on. The French republic was
justifiably proud of the Pasteur
Institute for bacteriological research, which opened in France in 1888 overseas
institutes became part of the colonial enterprise. One plan called for a large-scale
West African railroad network to lace through the region. A publics school
program built free schools in villages not controlled by missionaries.
Education, though, was not compulsory and was usually for boys.
Such
programs plainly served French interests. "Officially this process is
called civilizing, and after all, the term is apt, since the undertaking serves
to increase the degree of prosperity of our civilization," remarked one
Frenchman who opposed the colonial enterprise. None of these measures aimed to
give indigenous peoples political rights. As one historian puts it, "the
French government general was in the business not of making citizens, but of
civilizing its subjects." More telling, however, the French project was
not often successful. The French government did not have the resources to carry
out its plans, which proved much more expensive and complicated than anyone
imagined. Transportation costs ran very high. Libor posed the largest problems.
Here as elsewhere, Europeans faced massive resistance from the African
peasants, whom they wanted to do everything from building railroads to working
mines and carrying rubber. The Europeans resorted to forced labor, signing
agreements Slaves with local tribal leaders to deliver workers, and they turned
a blind eye to the continuing use of slave labor in the interior. For all of
these reasons, the colonial project did not produce the profits some expected.
In important respects, however, the French investment in colonialism was
cultural. Railroads, schools, and projects such as the Dakar harbor were, like
the Eiffel Tower (1889), symbols of the French nation modernity, power, and
world leadership.
THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA AND THE
CONGO
French expansion into \West
Africa was but one instance of Europe's voracity on the African continent. The
scope and speed with which the major European powers conquered and colonized,
asserting formal control was astonishing. The effects were profound. In 1875,
11 percent of the continent was in European hands. By 1902, the figure was 9O
percent. European powers mastered logical problems of transport and
communication ; they learned how to keep diseases at bay. They also had new
weapons. The Maxim gun, adopted by the British army in 18!9 and first used by
British colonial troops, pelted out as many as five hundred rounds a minute; it
turned encounters with indigenous forces into bloodbaths and made armed resistance
virtually impossible.
THE CONGO FREE STATE
In the 1870s, the British had
formed new imperial relationships along the costs of south and east Africa, and
in the north and west. A new phase of European involvement struck right at the
heart of the continent. Until the latter part of the nineteenth century this
territory had been out of bounds for Europeans. Therapids down stream on such
strategic rivers as the Congo and the Zambezi made it difficult to move inland,
and tropical diseases against which Europeans had little or no resistance were
lethal to most explorers. But during the 1870s, a new drive into central Africa
produced results. The target was the fertile valleys around the river Congo,
and the European colonizers were a privately financed group of Belgians paid by
their king, Leopold II ( 1 865-1909). They followed in the footsteps of Henry
Morton Stanley, an American Newspaper man and explorer who later became a
British subject and a knight of the realm. Stanley hacked his way through thick
canopy jungle and territory where no European had previously set foot. His
"scientific" journeys inspired the creation of a society of
researchers and students of African culture in Brussels, in reality a front
organization for the commercial company set up by Leopold. The ambitiously
named International Association for the Exploration and Civilization of the
Congo was set up in 1876, and set about signing treaties with local elites that
opened the whole Congo River basin to commercial exploitation. The vast
resources of palm oil and natural rubber and the promise of minerals (including
diamonds) were now within Europeans' reach.
The strongest resistance that Leopold's
company faced came from other colonial powers, particularly Portugal, which
objected to this new drive for occupation. In 1884, a conference was called in
Berlin to settle the matter of control over the Congo River basin. It was
chaired by the master of European power politics, Otto von Bismarck, and
attended by all the leading colonial nations, as well as the United States. The
conference established ground rules for a new phase of European economic and
political expansion- Europe two great overseas empires, Britain and France, and
the strongest emerging power inside Europe, germany, joined forces and settled
the Congo issue. Their dictates seemed to be perfectly in line with nineteenth century
liberalism. The Congo valleys would be open to free trade and commerce,- a
slave trade still run by some of the Islamic kingdoms in the region would be suppressed
in favor of free labor and a Congo Free State would be set up, denying the
region to the formal control of any single European country. In reality the
"Congo Free State" was run by Leopold's private company, and the
region was opened up to unrestricted exploitation by a series of large European
corporations. The older slave trade was suppressed, but the European companies
took the "free" African labor guaranteed in Berlin and placed workers
in equally bad conditions. Huge tracts of land, larger than whole European
countries, became diamond mines or plantations for the extraction of palm oil, rubber,
or cocoa. African workers labored in appalling conditions, with no real
medicine or sanitation, too little food, and according to production schedules
that made European factory labor look mild by comparison. Hundreds of thousands
of African workers died from disease and overwork. Because European managers
did not respect the different cycle of seasons in central Africa, whole crop
years were lost, leading to famines. Laborers working in the heat of the dry
season often carried individual loads on their backs that would have been
handled by heavy machinery in a European factory. Thousands of Africans were
pressed into work harvesting goods Europe wanted. They did so for little or no
pay, under the threat of beatings and ritual mutilation for dozens of petty
offenses against the plantation companies, who made the laws of the 'Tree
State." Eventually the scandal of the Congo became too Grcat to go on
unquestioned- A whole generation of authors and journalist, most famously Joseph
Conrad in his hcart of darkness, publicized the arbitrary
brutality and the vast scale of
suffering. In 1908, Belgium was forced to take direct control of the Congo,
turning it into a Belgian colony. A few restrictions at least were imposed on
the activities of the great plantation companies that had brought a vast new
store of raw materials to European industry by using slavery in all but name.
THE PARTITION OF AFRICA
The occupation of Congo, and its
promise of great material wealth, pressured other colonial powers into
expanding their holdings. By the 1880s, the scramble for Africa was well
underway, hastened by stories of rubber forests or diamond mines in other parts
of central and southern Africa. The guarantees made at the 1884 Berlin
conference allowed the Europeans to take further steps. The French and
Portugese increased their holdings. Italy moved into territories along the Red
Sea, beside British-held land and the independent kingdom of Ethiopia.
Germany came to relatively to
empire overseas. Bismarck was reluctant to engage in an enterprise that he
believed would yield few economic or political advantages. Yet he did not want
either Britain or France to dominate Africa, and Germany seized colonies in
strategic locations. The German colonies in Cameroon and most of modern tanzania
separated the territories of older, more established powers. Though the German
were not the most enthusiastic colonialists, they were still fascinated by the
imperial adventure, and jealous of their territories. When the Herero people of
german Southwest Africa (now
Namibia) rebelled in the early
1900s, the Germans responded with a vicious campaign of village burning
and ethnic killing that nearly
annihilated the Herero. Great Britain and France had their own ambitions.
The French aimed to move west to
east across the continent, an important reason for the French expedition to
Fashoda (in the Sudan) in 1898 (see below). Britain's part in the
"scramble" took place largely in southern and eastem Africa, and was
encapsulated in the dreams and career of one man: the diamond tycoon, colonial
politician, and imperial visionary Cecil Rhodes. Rhodes, who made a fortune
from the South African diamond mines in thc l870s and l88Os and founded the
diamond mining company DeBeers, became prime minister of Britain Cape Colony in
1890. (He left part of this fortune for the creation of the Rhodes scholarships
to educate future leaders of the empire at Oxford.) In an uneasy alliance with
the Boer settlers in their independent republics and with varying levels of
support from London, Rhodes pursued two great personal and imperial goals. The
personal goal was to build a southern African empire that was founded on
diamonds. "Rhodesia" would fly the Union Jack out of pride but send
its profits into Rhodes' own companies.
Through bribery, double dealing, careful coalition politics with the british
and boer settlers, warfare, and outright theft, Rhodes helped carve out
territories occupying the modern nations of Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and
Botswana-most of the savannah of southern Africa. Rhodes had a broader imperial
vision, one colonialists that he shared with the new British colonial secretary
in the late 1890s, Joseph Chamberlain. The first part of that vision was a
British presence along the whole of eastern Africa, symbolized by the goal of a
"Cape-to- Cairo" railway. The second was that the empire should make Britain self-sufficient, with British
industry able to run on the goods and raw materials shipped in from its
colonies, then exporting many finished products back to those lands. Once the
territories of "Zambeziland" and "Rhodesia" were taken,
Rhodes found himself turning against the European settlers in the region, a
conflict that led to outright war in 1899 (see below). This battle over
strategic advantage, diamonds, and European pride was symbolic of the
"scramble." As each European power sought its "place in the
sun," in the famous phrase of the German Kaiser William II, they brought
more and more of Africa under direct colonial control. It created a whole new
scale of plunder as companies were designed and managed to strip the continent
of its resources, and African peoples faced a combination of direct European
control and "indirect rule" which allowed local elites friendly to
European interests literally to lord over those who resisted. The partition of
Africa was the most striking instance of the new imperialism, with
international and domestic repercussions.
IMPERIAL
CULTURE
HOW
DID EMPIRE AFFECT EUROPEAN IDENTITY?
The relationship between the
metro pole and the colonies was not carried on at a distance; imperialism was
thoroughly anchored in late nineteenth-century Western culture. Images of
empire were everywhere in the metro pole. They were not just in the
propagandist literature distributed by the proponents of colonial expansion,
but on tins of tea and boxes of cocoa, as background themes in posters
advertising everything from dance halls to sewing machines. Museums and world's
fairs displayed the products of empire and introduced spectators to
"exotic peoples" who were now benefiting from European
"education." Music halls rang to the sound of imperialist songs.
Empire was almost always present in novels of the period, sometimes appearing
as a faraway setting for fantasy, adventure, or stories of self-discovery.
Sometimes imperial themes and peoples were presented as a subtly menacing
presence at home. Even in the tales of Sherlock Holmes, which were set in London and not overtly imperialist, the
furnishings of empire provided instantly recognizable signs of opulence and
decaden ce. Ln The Sign oJ Four, Holmes visits a gentleman in a lavish
apartment: "Two great tiger skins thrown athwart [the carpet] increased
the suggestion of Eastern luxury as did a huge hookah which stood upon a mat in
the comer." In "The Man with the Twisted Lip," l Vatson wanders
into one of the supposed opium dens in the East End of London, and is waited on
by a "sallow Malay attendant." The "dens" themselves were
largely an invention; police records of the time show very few locations in
London that supplied the drug. As a realm of fantasy, overseas empires and
"exotic" cultures became part of the centuryi sexual culture. Photos
and postcards of North African harems or "unveiled" Arab women were
common in European pornography, as were colonial memoirs that chronicled the
sexual adventures of their authors. Empire, however, was not simply background;
it played an important part in establishing European identity. In the case of
France, the "civilizing mission" demonstrated to French citizens the
grandeur of their nation. Building railroads and 'bringing progress to other
lands" illustrated the vigor of the French republic. Many
British writers spoke in similar
tones. One called the British empire 'the greatest secular agency for good
known to the world." Another, using more religious Empire, language,
argued, "The Britiih race may safely be called a missionary race. The
command to go and teach all nations is one that the British people have,
whether dchtly or wrongly, regarded as specially laid upon themselves."
The sense of high moral purpose was not restricted to male writers or authority
figures. In England, the United States, Cermany, and France, the speeches and
projects of women's reform movements were full of references to empire and the
civilizing mission. Britain's woman suffrage movement, for instance, was
fiercely. critical of the British government but often equally nationalist and
imperialist. Asking that women be brought into British politics seemed to
involve calling on them to take on imperial, as well as civic,
responsibilities. British women reformers wrote about the oppression of Indian
women by child marriage and sati, and saw themselves shouldering the
"white woman's burden" of reform. The French suffragist Hubertine
Auclert \^/rote a book entitle d Arab Women in Algeria (1900), which angrily
indicted both French colonial administrators for their indifference to the condition
of women in their domains and the French
republic for shrugging off the
claims of women at home. Her arguments stung precisely because they rested on
the assumption that European culture should be enlightened. Arab women were
"victims of Muslim debauchery," wrote Auclert, and polygamy led to
"intellectual degeneracy." The image of women languishing in the
colonies not only dramatized the need for reform, it enabled European women in
their home countries to see themselves as bearers of progress. The liberal
writer and political theorist John Stuart Mill (see Chapter 20) regularly used
the colonial world as a foil. \flhen he wanted to drive home a point about freedom
of speech or religion, he pointed to India as a counter example, trading in stereotypes
about Hindu or Muslim "obscurantism," and appealing to British convictions
that theirs was the superior civilization. This contrast between colonial
backwardness or moral degeneration and European civility and stability shaped
Vestern culture and political debate. Imperial culture also gave new prominence
to theories of race. In the 1850s, Count Arthur de Cobineau (181{-1882) had
written a massive tome on Tbe Ine4uality oJ tbe Races, but the book sparked
little interest until the period of the new imperialism, when it was translated
into English and widely discussed. For Gobineau, race offered the "master key"
to understandlng lems in the modern
world. He argued, "The racial question overshadows all other problems of
history . . .the ineguality of the races from whose fusion a people is formed
is enough to explain the whole course of it destiny-'Some of Cobineau's ideas
followed from earlier Enlightenment projects that compared and examined different
cultures and govemments. Unlike his Enlightenment predecessors, however,
Cobineau did not believe that environment had any effect on politics, culture,
or morals. Race was all. He argued that a people degenerated when it no longer
had "the same blood in its veins, continual adulteration having gradually affected
the quality of that blood." Enlightenment thinkers often argued that
slavery made its victims unable to understand liberty. Cobineau, by contrast,
asserted
that slavery proved its victims'
racial inferiority. Houston Stewart Chamberlain (tSSS-1s27), the son of a
British admiral, tried to improve Gobineaul theories and make them more
"scientific." That meant tying racial theories to the new scientific
writing about evolution, Charles Darwin's natural science, and Herbert Spencer!
views about the evolution of societies. (On Darwin and Spencer, see Chapter
23.) Like other european thinkers concerned with race, Chamberlain used the
concept of evolutionary change to show that races changed over time'
Chamberlaint books proved extremely popul5r, selling tens of thousands of
copies in England and Cermany. Francis Galton (1822-191t), a British scientist
who studied evolution, similarly explored how hereditary traits were
communicated from generation to generation. In 1883, Calton first used the term
"eugenics" to refer to the science of improving the "racial
qualities" of humanity through selective breeding of "superior types."
Karl Pearson (1857-1936), who did pioneering work in the use of statistics,
turned his systematic analysis to studies of intelligence and
"genius," sharing
Galton's worries that only new
policies of racial management would check Europe's impen&ng decline. These
theories did not, by themselves, produce an imperialist mindset, and they were
closely linked with other developments in European culture, particularly renewed
antagonism about social class and a fresh wave of European anti-Semitism (see
Chapter 23). Yet the increasingly scientific racism of late nineteenth- century
Europe made it easier for many to reconcile the rhetoric of progress,
individual freedom, and the "civilizing mission" with contempt for
other peoples. It also provided a rationale for imperial conquest and a
justification for the bloodshed that imperialism brought, for instance, in
Africa'
Still, Europeans disagreed on
these issues. Politicians and writers who championed imperialism, or offered
racial lustifications for it, met with opposition- Such thinkers as Hobson and
lrnin condemned the entire imperial enterprise as an act of greed and
antidemocratic arrogance- V'riters such as Joseph Conrad, who shared many of
their contemporaried racism, nevertheless believed that imperialism signaled
deeply rooted pathologies in European culture. In short, one result of
imperialism was serious debate on its effects and causes. Many of the
anti-imperialists were men and women from the colonies themselves, who brought
their case to the metropole. The British Committee of the Indian National
Congress, for instance, gathered together many members of london's Indian
community determined to educate British public opinion about the exploitation
of Indian peoples and resources. This work involved speaking tours,
demonstrations, and meetings with potentially sympathetic British radicals and
socialists. Perhaps the most defiant of all anti-imperialist actions was the
London Pan-African conference of 1900, staged at the height of the
"scramble for Africa" and during the Boer \War (see below). The
conference grew out of an international tradition of African American, British,
and American antislavery movements, and out of groups like the African
Association (founded in 1897), which brought the rhetoric used earlier to
abolish slavery to bear on the tactics of European imperialism. They protested
forced labor in the mining compounds of South Africa as akin to slavery and
asked in very moderate tones for some autonomy and representation for native
African peoples. The Pan-African Conference of tgOO r.r,as smal1, but it drew
delegates from the Caribbean, \Vest Africa, and North America, including the
thirty-two-year-old Harvard Ph.D. and leadlng African American intellectual \f.
E. B. Dubois (1868-1963). The conference issued a proclamation "To the
Nations of the \World," with a famous introduction rr'rirten bl' DuBois '
The Problem of rhe n"en- IupenrAL CULTuRE 809 tieth century is the problem
of the color line. . . . In the metropolis of the modern world, in this the
closing year of the nineteenth century" the proclamation read, "there
has been assembled a congress of men and women of African blood, to deliberate
solemnly the present situation and outlook of the darker races of
mankind." The British government ignored the conference completely. Yet
Pan-Africanism, like Indian nationalism, grew by sudden (and, for imperialists,
disturbing) leaps after Voild Var I. In recent years historians have become
increasingly interested in colonial cultures, or the results of the imperial
encounter across the world. Cities such as Bombay, Calcutta, and Shanghai
boomed in the period, more than tripling in size. Hong Kong and other
"treaty ports", run as
outposts of European commerce and culture, were transformed as Europeans built
banks. shipping enterprises,
schools, and military academies, and engaged in missionary activities. The variety
of national experiences makes generalization very difficult, but w€ can
underscore a few points. First, colonialism created new, hybrid cultures. Both European
and indigenous institutions and practices, especially religion, were
transformed by their contact with each other.. Second, although Europeans often
considered the areas they annexed
"laboratories" for creating well-disciplined and orderly societies,
the social changes Europeans brought in their wake confounded such plans. In
both western and southern Africa, European demands for labor brought men out of
their villages, leaving their families behind, and
crowded them by the thousands
into the shantytowns bordering sprawling new cities. Enterprising locals set up
all manner of illegal businesses catering to transitory male workers,
disconcerting European authorities in the process. HoPes that European rule
would create a well-disciplined labor force and well-patrolled cities were
quickly dashed. Third, authorities on both side of the colonial encounter
worried enormously about preserving
national traditions children of such unions. But such prohibitions only and
identity in the face of an inevitably hybrid and drove relations underground,
increasing the gap be constantly changing colonial culture. Especially in China
and India, debates about whether education should be "westernized' or
continue on traditional lines set off fierce debates. Chinese elites, already divided
over such customs as foot binding and concubinage (the legal practice of
maintaining formal sexual partners for men outside their marriage), found their
over territories dilemmas heightened as imperialism became a more powerful
force. Uncertain whether such practices should be repudiated or defended, they
wrestled with great anguish over the ways in which their own culture had been
changed by the corruption of colonialism. Proponents of reform and change in
China or India had to sort through their stance toward "modern" western
culture, the culture of the colonizers, and "traditional" popular
culture. For their part, British, French, and Dutch colonial authorities
fretted that too Much familiarity between colonized and colonizer would weaken
European traditions and undermine European power. In Phnom Penh, Cambodia (then
part The turn of the twentieth century brought a series of of French Indochina),
where French citizens lived in crises to the western empires. Those crises did
not end neighborhoods separated from the rest of the city by a moat, colonial
authorities nonetheless required "dressing appropriately and keeping a
distance from the natives."Scandalized by what he considered the absence of
decorum among the French in the city, a French journalist asserted that a
French woman should never be seen in the public market. "The Asians cannot
understand such a fall." European women were to uphold European standards
and prestige. Not surprisingly, sexual relations provoked the most anxiety and
also the most contradictory responses. "ln this hot climate, passions run
higher" wrote a French administrator in Algeria. "The French soldiers
seek out Arab women due to their strangeness and newness." "lt was
common practice for unmarried Englishmen resident in China to keep a Chinese
girl, and I did as others
did," reported a British man
stationed in Shanghai. But when he followed convention and married an English woman,
he sent, his Chinese mistress and their three children to England to avoid any
awkwardness. European administrators fitfully tried to prohibit liaisons
between European men and indigenous women, labeling such affairs as
"corrupting" and "nearly always disastrous." They grew
increasingly hostile to the children of such unions. But such prohibitions only
drove relations underground, increasing the gap between the public facade of
colonial rule and the private reality of colonial lives. In this and other
spheres, colonial culture forced a series of compromises about “acceptability,"
and created changing, sometimes subtle, ethnic hierarchies. And such local and
personal dramas were no less complex
than the Great Powers' clashes over territories.
CRISES
OF EMPIRE AT THE TURN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
WHY
WAS THE BOER WAR UNIQUE?
The turn of the twentieth century
brought a series of crises to the Western empires. Those crises did not end
European rule. They did, however, create sharp tensions between western
nations. The crises also drove imperial nations to expand their economic and
military commitments in territories overseas. They shook western confidence. In
all of these ways, they became central to western culture in the years before
world war I.
FASHODA
The first crisis, in the fall of
1898, pitted Britain against France at Fashoda, in the Egyptian Sudan.
Britain's establishment of a "protectorate" in Egypt after the 1880s
Suez Canal confrontation had several important effects. It changed British
strategy in east Africa, encouraging Rhodes's "Cape to Cairo" ideas.
It also opened up the archaeological and cultural treasures of Egypt's past to
British adventurers and academics, keen student sand self-aggrandizing
editors----of history. It seemed that the most ancient civilization was now
linked to the most successful modem one, and British explorers could trace the
"source of the Nile" by traveling up waters that were governed under
a British flag. Explorers were not the only Britons to venture farther up the
Nile. In the name of protecting the new, pro-British ruler, Britain intervened
in an Islamic uprising in the Sudan. An Anglo-Egyptian force was sent to the Sudanese
capital, Khartoum, led by the most flamboyant- and perhaps least sensible---of Britain
colonial generals, Charles "Chinese" Gordon, well known for his role
in suppressing the Taiping Rebellion.The Sudanese rebels, led by Mahdi (a
religious leaders who claimed to be the successor to the prophet Muhammad) be
sieged Cordon. British forces were ill prepared to move south on the Nile in
strength, Cordon ended up dying a "hero death" as the rebels stormed
Khartoum. Avenging Gordon occupied officials in Egypt and the British popular
imagination for more than a decade. In 1898, a second large-scale rcbellion
provided the opportunity. An Anglo-Egyptian army commanded by a methodical and
ambitious engineer, General Horatio Kitchener, sailed south up the Nile and
attacked Khartoum. Using modern rifles, artillery, and machine guns, they
massacred the Mahdi army at the town of Omdurman and retook Khartoum. Gordon's
body was disinterred and reburied
with pomp and circumstance as the British public celebrated a famous
and easy victory. That victory
brought complications, however. France, which held territories in central
Africa next door to the Sudan, saw the British presence along the eastern side
of Africa as a prelude to Britain's dominance of the whole continent. A French
expedition was sent to the Sudanese town of fashoda to challenge British claims
to the southernmost part of the territory. The French faced off with troops
from Kitchener's army. For a few weeks in September 1898 the situation teetered
on the brink of war. The matter was resolved, however, when Britain not only
called France's bluff but also provided guarantees against further expansion by
cementing borders for the new "Anglo-Egyptian Sudan," an even greater
extension of the political control that had begun with the Suez Canal.
ETHIOPIA
Traditional methods of imperial
rule and notions of European military and moral superiority faced other
challenges at the turn of the
century. The Boxer Rebellion in China was one of a number of indigenous
revolts against western imperial
methods and its consequences. The Russo-Japanese war was a dangerously large
conflict between two imperial powers that challenged nations of inherent
European superiority over all the peoples of the world.
Other
complications for European powers arose as well. During the 1880s and 1890s
ltaly had been developing a small empire of its own along the shores of the Red
Sea. Italy annexed Eritrea and parts of Somalia, and shortly after the death of
Gordon at Khartoum defeated an invasion of its new colonies by the Mahdis
forces. These first colonial successes encouraged Italian politicians, still
trying to
build a modern industrial nation,
to mount a much more ambitious imperial project. In 1896, an expedition was
sent to conquer Ethiopia. Ethiopia was a
mountainous, in land empire, the last major independent African kingdom. Its
emperor, Menelik II, was a savvy politician and shrewd military commander. His
subjects were largely Christian, and the empire trade had allowed Menelik to
invest in the latest European artillery to guard his vast holdings. The
expedition, which consisted of a few thousand professional ltalian soldiers and
many more Somali conscripts, marched into the mountain passes of Ethiopia.
Menelik let them come, knowing that by keeping to the roads the Italian
commanders would have to divide their forces. Menelik own huge army moved over
the mountains themselves, and as the disorganized Italian command tried to
regroup near the town of Adowa in March 1896, the Ethiopian army set on the
separate columns and destroyed them completely, killing six thousand. Adowa was
a national humiliation for Italy, and an important symbol for African political
radicals and reformers during the early twentieth century. Menelik's prosperous
kingdom seemed a puzzling and perhaps dangerous exception to European judgments
about African cultures generally.'
SOUTH AFRICA: THE BOER WAR
Elsewhere in Africa vaulting
ambitions led to an even more troubling kind of conflict' Europeans fighting
European settlers. The Afrikaners, also ca11ed Boers (an appropriation of the
Dutch word for "farmer"), were settlers from the Netherlands and
Switzerland who had arrived in South Africa with the Dutch East India Company in the early 1800s, and who had a
long and troubled relationship with their imperial neighbor, great Britain.
Over the course of the nineteenth century the Afrikaners trekked inland from
the Cape, setting up two independent republics away from the influence of
Britain' the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. In the mid 1880s, gold
reserves were discovered in the Transvaal. The British diamond magnate and
imperialist Cecil Rhodes had actually tried to provoke war between Britain and
the Boers in hopes of adding the Afrikaners prosperous diamond mines and
pastureland to his own territory of "Rhodesia." In 1899, as the
result of a series of disputes, Britain did go to war with the Afrikaners.
Despite the recent British victory in the Sudan, the British army was woefully
unprepared for the war, supplies, communications, and medicine for the army in
South Africa were a shambles. These initial problems were followed by several
humiliating defeats as British columns were shot to pieces by Afrika forces who
knew the terrain. British garrisons at the towns of Ladysmith and Mafeking were
besieged. Angered and embarrassed by these early failures the British
government, particularly the colonial secretary Joseph Chamberlain, refused any
compromise. The new British commander, Sir Robert Roberts, used superior British
resources and the railroads built to service the diamond mines to his advantage.
British forces Steam rolled the Boers, relieved the besieged British garrisons,
and took the Afrikaner capital at Pretoria. There were celebrations in London,
and hopes that the war was now over. The Afrikaners, however, were determined
never to surrender. Supplied by other European nations. Particularly germany
and the Netherlands, the ,Afrikaners took to the wilderness in
"commandos" (small raiding parties) and fought a guerrilla war that
dragged on for another three years. British losses due to the commandos and
disease led British generals to take most of the comprehensive and brutal steps
to which later western armies would frequently resort in the face of guerrilla warfare.
Armored blockhouses were set up to guard strategic locations, shooting at
anything that moved.
Special cavalry units often using
Irish or Australian horsemen fighting for the "mother country,"
Britain were sent in to fight the guerrillas on their own terms, each side
committing its share of atrocities. Black Africans, despised by both sides,
suffered the effects of famine and disease as the war destroyed valuable farm land. The British also instituted
"concentration camp” the first use
of the term-where Afrikaner civilians were rounded up and forced to live in
appalling conditions so that they would be unable to lend aid to the
guerrillas. Nearly twenty thousand civilians died due to disease and poor
sanitation over the course of two years. These measures provoked an
international backlash. European and American newspapers lambasted the British
as imperial bullies. The concentration camps bred opposition in Britain itself
where protesters, labeled "pro- Boers" by the conservative press,
campaigned against these violations of white Europeans' rights while saying
very little about the fate of native Africans in the conflict. In the end, the
Afrikaners acquiesced. Afrikaner politicians signed their old republics over to
a new, Britis “union of South Africa" that gave them a share of political
power. The settlement created an uneasy alliance between English settlers and
Afrikaners, politicians for both parties preserved their high standards of
having by relying on cheap African labor and, eventually, a system of racial
segregation known as apartheid.
U.S. IMPERIALISM
Another imperial power began to
emerge in the 1890s: the United States. During the late nineteenth century,
American governments and private interests that supported imperial expansion
played a double game. The United States acted as the champion of the underdeveloped
countries in the western Hemisphere when they were threatened from Europe. Yet
America was willing, whenever it suited, to prey on its neighbors either
"informally" or formally. This ultimately brought conflict with
another, fragile western empire. Spaini feeble hold on its Caribbean and
Pacific colonies was plagued by rebellion in the 1880s and 1890s. The American
popular press talked up the cause of the rebels, and when an American
battleship accidentally exploded in port at Havana, Cuba, American imperialists
and the press clamored for a war of revenge. The administration of President
william McKinley was extremely wary of going to war, but McKinley also
understood political necessity. The United States stepped in to protect its investments, to
guarantee the maritim. security of trade routes in the Americas and the
Pacific, and to demonstrate the power of the newly built-up American navy. It
declared war on Spain in 1898 on trumped-up grounds and swiftly won' In Spain,
the Spanish' American war provoked an entire generation of writers,
politicians, and intellectuals to national soul searching. This led to the end
of the Spanish monarchy in l9l2 and the germination of political tensions that
eventually exploded in the Spanish Ciul war of the 1930s. ... In the same year
that the United States won its "splendid little way'' against Spain, it
also annexed Puerto Rico, established a "protectorate" over Cuba, and
fought a short but brutal war against Philippine rebels who liked American
colonialism no better than the Spanish kind. In the Americas, the United States
continued its interventions. when the Colombian province of Panama threatened
to rebel in 190'3, the American quickly backed the rebels, recognized Panama as
a republic, and then proceeded to grant it protection while Americans built the
Panama Canal on land leased from the new government' The Panama Canal (which
opened officially in 1914), like Britain canal at Suez, cemented American dominance Of the seas in the Americas
and the weastern Pacific' Interventions in Hawaii and later Santo Domingo were further
proof that the United States was no less an imperial
power than the nations of Europe.
CONCLUSION
In the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, the longstanding relationship between European nations and
the rest of the world entered a new stage' That stage was distinguished by the
stunningly rapid extension of formal European control and by new patterns of
discipline and settlement. It was driven by the rising economic needs of the
industrial \West, by territorial conflict, and by nationalism, which by the
late nineteenth century linked nationhood to empire. Among its immediate
results was the creation of a "self-consciously imperial" culture in
the Vest. At the same time, however, it plainly created unease in Europe, and
contributed powerfully to the sense of crisis that swept through the late
nineteenth- century west. For all its force, this European expansion was never
unchallenged. Imperialism provoked resistance and required constantly changing
strategies of rule' During world-war I, mobilizing the resources of empire
would become crucial to victory' In the aftermath, reimposing the conditions of
the late ninetcenth century would become nearly impossible'' And over the
longer term, the political structure, economic developments, and patterns of
race relations established in this pcriod would be contested throughout the
twentieth century.
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